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1. At 8:pproximately' l.330 on 25 November, Misty 41, Holden/Konopka, heard ( 1 · ,
Gram.et 01 calling for his wing man - 02 - on guard. We had just returned
}'
from the tanker and were south west of delta lS. We immediately switched
to guard and called GrOlllJlet 01. Crown 6 also came up on guard at this time.
01 stated that he thought he had lost his wing man. Cro'Wn 6 asked his
position and 01 passed it in La.t/IDng. We asked i f he was close to delta
29J Grommet 01 said negative; that they had just started up route 1.37 north
of Ban I.aboy when his wing man transmitted he was taking a hit. He was
unable to raise him on frequency after that. We immediately turned north
to head towards .his position. At this time we began receiving a strong
beeE!'r• Enroute to the area we contacted Invert on guard for clearance
into the PCA and notified them that the downed aircraft was probably in
North Vietnam. Invert got radar contact with us and passed pidgeons to
the area. Enroute to the area -we heard a call for 02 to come up voice.
G
t o
e re
ss a
Ban La.Boy and began loo~ for the crash site. The wea
r -was
S/S coverage of strato-'.Oll:, bases at 3500 1 with tops at 7000 1 • This
coverage -was interspersed with large holes which w:>uld form, laet for
20 - JO minutes, and then close in again. We attempted to get down
through some of these clear areas to locate the crash site. On our !irst
ass we established voice contact with 02A. He said he was 11 0.K. I guese"•
We were c
ed once y nver a
s · l.D1e and requested to fzy south as
they were showing us 11 too close to Waterloo". We were across the NVN
border at this tim3. We requested Invert to contact Blue Chip and inform
them or the survivor.a• pos· ion in NVN. A large hole tanned over the area,
and at a roximate 1345 'We located the still burning aircraft wreakage.
c ash 1'1te - s on
way
t is a roximatel
meters north of the Nam Carona river. -e a so o serve sever
peop
l
rue
in
e
diate vicinity. <A'1 the next pass
we went over the crash site; 02A came up vo ce an said 'W passed right
over him. We asked Invert to nark the position on radar, and Invert, again,
tried to direct us to :fly south. For the third time, "1e asked Invert to
contact Blue Chip and inform them of the situation. We also requested
clearance to expend on the trucks moving toward the crash site and for
additional ordnance to be directed to tre area. Misty 41 expended 2Qnm
and several WP rockets on the road and suceeded in driVing the trucks and
people under cover. On one pass we received approximately 30 to 40 rounds
of 2J/37mm fire from a gun position along route 1.37 in the vicinity of
delta 58. On another pass we received an undetermined number of rounds of
ZPU. This osition was atl>ut 1 K. ncr th of delta 58. We again contacted
02A and as e
e a con ac wi
h1lii but that Hfie shoUld have gotten out".
radio and come up again in .30 minutes .......wi_e__________________
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ve answer. We
n
e
st place.
At app
t
,
eye ed
e a er.
'N8.s on the
scene holding south of delta 58, and Invert las trying to obtain fighters.
The wather remained b&eically the same ldth a gradual improvement as the
afternoon progressed. While K-41 was on the tanker, M-51 arrived on the
scene and was hit b;y a 23/37rmn. They RTBed to Ubon. 1-f.isty 61 -was on the
tanker when K-41. a?Tivad at the tanker, they remained ld.th M-41 and returned to the SAR area lid.th us at 1445. We showed the crash site to them,
described the looation of the survivor,, and marked the gun positions for
them. This cycle was spent waiting on fighters,, the weather, and tr-Jing
to get the SAR forces launched. Misty 61 went to the tanker early to get
a cycle started so one Misty w::>uld be on the scene at ·all times. A
"Gunfighter• fi:i8ht. arrived, however due to the load (high drag and napes)
-we didn't want to put them on the 23/37m sites. Mistgr 4l went for a tanker
_at approJd.mately 1545. Due to a mi.a-up by either Invert or Viking 1 Misty 61
was sent to Cherey track and so was not back on target when M-41 cycled to
the tanker.
s
ived back in the tar et area at about 1610. Misty
61 was upending Cookie, Flight of 105's with CB - 1 on t e
nm gun
sites. Hi.sty 41 observed 75 to 100 rounds of 23/37mm. directed at M-61 and
Cookie flight.. 1 with air bursts at 7000 ft. Additional flights were
~ended b1 M-61 ld.th no growxi fire response. Misty 41 felt that the
23/37mm was silenced and, furthennore, sufficiently far enough south not
to be a !actor to the Sandys and the Jolly 1 s anyway. We requested Crown 6
to send in the Sandiea. The Sandies and the Jolly 1 s were being held in
Iaos a considerable . distance from the SAR area. Due to the fire received
by M-41, M-51, am H-61, Crolm 6 would not allow them in the area until
the gUl'l$ were sileo=ed. We felt that due to the distance from the guns
to the SAR area they l0uldn 1 t be a factor for t:te Sandy's. Obtaining fast
mover fll8'lta !or AAA supp:-ession was sporadic. The first flight sent to
us was loaded napes and high drags and we w:>uldn •t put them on the guns •
Subsequent fii;hts all had CBU-24 1 a and M-ll7's. There were numerous
flights on tanker being controlled by' Invert. It appeared that Cro'Wl'l 6
was having comnunication difficulties wl..th Invert and was unable to coordinate effectively with them for a smooth, steady now of fighters. The
Sandy's were fin&J.ly released to the area at approxi.n:Btely 1650,, however,
the Jolly 1s, and Sandy's 9 and 10, were still held a considerable distance
away. We led Sandy 1 and 2 to the crash site and descnbed the survivors
location. Sandy 1 and 2 began an ADF search to pinpoint his position and
fina.l..ly suceeded in locating him. Miscy 4l departed for the tanker at
approximately' 1730' Misty; 61 111as re-enteri~ the area at this time. We
briefed them the.t the Sani{y-•s wre in the area pinpointing the survivor
and the Jolly-•s were holding. The weather in the immediate area waa clear
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At appraximately 1330 hours on 25 Novanber, Misty 51, (Weidman/Kellum),
was en-route to the tanker on Peach track to refuel when the Grommet 02
SAR e:tfbrt was started. Being busy with the tanker, we were unable to ·
monitor the proceedings until dropping off the tanker. We then proceeded
back to the foxtrot area to meet Lunar flight at 1420. As we proceeded
to the area. we called Invert .f'or the particulars of the SAR effort and got
the general location of the effort. We infonned them we were full of fuel
and wre available for the SAR effort. Receiving no reply other then
acknowledgment we proceeded to south of Tchepone to await Lunar flight.
We monitored the SAR effort until about 1410 when w called Crown on guard
and told them of our fuel state and availability tO participate in the
effb rt. They said they would contact us i f we were n~eded. At approximately
1425 we called Invert and asked about Lunar flight. T'r.ey said they had not
heard from them. About a minute later, Crown called us ani asked us to
relieve Misty 41 who had to cycle to the tanker. We proceeded at once
toward the delta 58 area. As soon as -we were on frequency we heard M-41
go to the tanker. To "Wait so long to bring the next Misty into play in
my oponion is a mistake. We h&tt tO proceed to the area with nothing but
a.- tacan/DME and iro---real description from M-41 of the grourxi situation or
statua of the dololled pilots. Th6 only infornation le got was by simply
monitoring the radio. Arriving in the general area, Crown contacted us
and designated M-51 on scene coDIMnder. We picked up Nail 62, brought him
over on frequency, ani found he was obbiting above the clouds over the
crash sight. At this time, there was a solid overcast layer at about 6000'
tha. t looked fairly thick. Due to our not knowing tM exact location of
the downed ainnen, We told Nail 62 to orbit over the clouds and act as
relay to all agencies and top caver for us. We elected to go about 8 miles
south, drop under the clouds and try to establish contact with Groment
02A and B. Finiing the bases of the blouds just above the mountain pea.ks,
w entered at Ban Labdy just south of delta 58 and proceeded up Rt 137 to
the coordinates trat we had copied doWl. We spotted the general area and
made a sweeping pass over it and hear.one of the Granmets come up on radio
and BBiY he heard us and we were close. Having very litUe room to turn we
slid behind the mountains and elected to make another pass to narrow down
Grommet 1 s exact position. On the secooo pass -we told Granmet 'W9 would
light the burner a:rxi to infonn us how we passed\ over him. Doing this, he
informed us to come dolfl the slope at him and that we were very near. We
again swung arourxi to make a pass to pinpoint his position. This time we
passed exacUy over him and he told us we were receiving J?mm and heavy
ZPU fire. Because of the very low clauds and our ability to talk to him
only when very close, we f'lected to lllB.ke ~more pass to fix the guns
positions relative to the pilots, and then pop up through t~e clouds.
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Running just e&!lt of the road, we established voice contact with Grommet
and immediately wre hit by a 37mm shell in the left aileron. We
punched otf the stones and departed for NKP eventually laniing at Ubon.

To make a few obs81"'1'8.tions, Mist;r 51 should have been brought into the
effort in t1m to Jave been throughly briefed by Misty 41 and allowed to
set up a f'uel-cycle overlap so as to always haveing a Misty in the area.
This would allow a con&tant update of the situation as well as the ability
to put fast movers in at any break in the -weather.

~A/JI~

JAMES D. WEiill'iAN, L Lt, USAF
Commando Sabre Pilot

- - ---- - - --- -----
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RA.I.PH C. DELLUM, Capt, USAF
Comnando Sabre Pilot
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